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Abstract
The classical channel remote state preparation (ccRSP) is an important two-party primitive
in quantum cryptography. Alice (classical polynomial-time) and Bob (quantum polynomial-time)
exchange polynomial rounds of classical messages, and Bob finally gets random single-qubit states
while Alice finally gets classical descriptions of the states. In [T. Morimae, arXiv:2003.10712], an
information-theoretically-sound non-interactive protocol for the verification of quantum computing
was proposed. The verifier of the protocol is classical, but the trusted center is assumed that sends
random single-qubit states to the prover and their classical descriptions to the verifier. If the trusted
center can be replaced with a ccRSP protocol while keeping the information-theoretical soundness,
an information-theoretically-sound classical verification of quantum computing is possible, which
solves the long-standing open problem. In this paper, we show that it is not the case unless BQP is
contained in MA. We also consider a general verification protocol where the verifier or the trusted
center first sends quantum states to the prover, and then the prover and the verifier exchange a
constant round of classical messages. We show that the first quantum message transmission cannot
be replaced with an (even approximate) ccRSP protocol while keeping the information-theoretical
soundness unless BQP is contained in AM. We finally study the verification with the computational
soundness. We show that if a ccRSP protocol satisfies a certain condition even against any quantum
polynomial-time malicious prover, the replacement of the trusted center with the ccRSP protocol
realizes a computationally-sound classical verification of quantum computing. The condition is
weaker than the verifiability of the ccRSP. At this moment, however, there is no known ccRSP
protocol that satisfies the condition. If a simple construction of such a ccRSP protocol is found, the
combination of it with the trusted center verification model provides another simpler and modular
proof of the Mahadev’s result.
∗ tomoyuki.morimae@yukawa.kyoto-u.ac.jp
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I. INTRODUCTION
Whether quantum computing is classically verifiable or not is one of the most important
open problems in quantum information science [1–3]. If the soundness is the computational
one, the Mahadev’s breakthrough [4] solves the open problem affirmatively. Or, if more
than two provers, who are entangled but not allowed to communicate with each other, are
allowed, the information-theoretical soundness is possible for a classical verifier [5–9]. In this
paper, we focus on the single prover setup and the information-theoretical soundness (except
for Sec. V). Furthermore, we require that the honest prover is quantum polynomial-time,
and therefore the well-known fact BQP ⊆ IP does not solve the open problem.
In Ref. [10], an information-theoretically-sound non-interactive protocol for the verifica-
tion of quantum computing was proposed. In this protocol, the verifier is classical, but the
trusted center is assumed. The trusted center first sends random BB84 states (i.e., |0〉, |1〉,
|+〉 ≡ |0〉+|1〉√
2
, and |−〉 ≡ |0〉−|1〉√
2
) to the prover, and their classical descriptions to the verifier.
The prover then sends a classical message to the verifier. The verifier finally does classical
polynomial-time computing to make the decision. (For details, see Sec. II.)
The classical channel remote state preparation (ccRSP) is an important primitive in
quantum cryptography. It is a two-party protocol between Alice and Bob where Alice is
classical polynomial-time, and Bob is quantum polynomial-time. Alice and Bob exchange
polynomial rounds of classical messages, and Bob finally gets random single-qubit states
while Alice finally gets their classical descriptions. The concept of the remote state prepa-
ration was first introduced in Ref. [11] in the context of blind quantum computing. Ref. [12]
studies the remote state preparation in an abstract framework for blind quantum comput-
ing. Computationally-secure ccRSP protocols have been constructed under the standard
assumption in cryptography that the LWE is hard for quantum computing [13–16].
If the trusted center of the protocol of Ref. [10] can be replaced with a ccRSP proto-
col while keeping the information-theoretical soundness, the information-theoretically-sound
classical verification of quantum computing is possible, which solves the open problem af-
firmatively. In this paper, we show that it is not the case unless BQP ⊆ MA. Because
BQP ⊆ MA is not believed to happen, our result suggests that the trusted center cannot
be replaced with the ccRSP while keeping the information-theoretical soundness. (Actually,
what we obtain is a slightly stronger result, BQP ⊆ MABQP, where MABQP is MA with
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honest quantum polynomial-time Merlin. Because MABQP ⊆ MA, we obtain BQP ⊆ MA.)
Replacing the trusted center of Ref. [10] with the ccRSP is a natural approach to solve
the open problem, but our result shows that it does not work. It does not mean the impos-
sibility of the (information-theoretically sound) classical verification of quantum computing,
because there might be another approach, but at this moment we do not know any promis-
ing approach. (For example, the combination of the FK protocol [17] with the ccRSP will
not work, because the malicious unbounded prover can learn all trap information. See Ap-
pendix B.) On the other hand, showing the impossibility of the (information-theoretically
sound) classical verification of quantum computing is also difficult, because it means the
separation between BQP and BPP. (If we define IPBQP as the set of decision problems that
are verified by an IP protocol with an honest quantum polynomial-time prover, we have
BPP ⊆ IPBQP ⊆ BQP. Therefore, IPBQP 6= BQP means BPP 6= BQP.)
We also consider a general verification protocol where the verifier or the trusted center
first sends quantum states to the prover, and then the prover and the verifier exchange a
constant round of classical messages. We show that the first quantum message transmission
cannot be replaced with a ccRSP protocol unless BQP is contained in AM. (More precisely,
what we actually obtain is BQP ⊆ IPBQP[const], where [const] means a constant round, but
it leads to BQP ⊆ AM because IPBQP[const] ⊆ IP[const] ⊆ AM.)
The second proof technique can also be applied to show that replacing the trusted center
in the protocol of Ref. [10] with the ccRSP is impossible unless BQP ⊆ AM, but we can
show a stronger result, namely, BQP ⊆ MA, by using the specific structure of the protocol
of Ref. [10].
In the second result, the impossibility can be shown even for approximate ccRSP protocols
where the prover and the verifier succeed with some probability psucc even if the prover is
honest, and what the prover gets is close to the ideal states.
We also study the verification with the computational soundness. We show that if a ccRSP
protocol satisfies a certain condition even against any quantum polynomial-time malicious
prover, the replacement of the trusted center of the protocol of Ref. [10] with the ccRSP
protocol realizes a computationally-sound classical verification of quantum computing. The
condition is weaker than the verifiability of the ccRSP. At this moment, however, no ccRSP
protocol is known that satisfies the condition. If a ccRSP protocol that satisfies the condition
is constructed in a simple way, the combination of it with the protocol of Ref. [10] provides
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another simpler and modular proof of the Mahadev’s result.
Finally, let us mention a recent related work. The paper [18] showed three results on
the ccRSP in the context of blind quantum computing. First, they showed that the ccRSP
cannot be composable secure under the no-cloning theorem. There is, however, a possibility
that the BFK protocol [19] combined with a ccRSP protocol is still composable secure. Their
second result is that it is not the case unless the no-signaling principle is violated. Finally,
they showed that the BFK protocol combined with the Qfactory protocol [15] satisfies the
game-based security.
This paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II, we review the verification protocol of
Ref. [10]. In Sec. III, we show our first result, and then in Sec. IV, we show the second result
on the general setup. We finally study the verification with the computational soundness
in Sec. V. The computational soundness is considered only in the last section. In other
sections, we implicitly assume that the malicious prover is unbounded.
II. THE VERIFICATION PROTOCOL OF REF. [10]
In this section, we review the verification protocol of Ref. [10]. The protocol is given in
Fig. 1. It was shown in Ref. [10] that the protocol can verify any BQP problem:
Theorem 1 (Ref. [10]) For any promise problem A = (Ayes, Ano) in BQP, Protocol 1
satisfies both of the following with some c and s such that c− s ≥ 1
poly(|x|) :
• If x ∈ Ayes, the honest quantum polynomial-time prover’s behavior makes the verifier
accept with probability at least c.
• If x ∈ Ano, the verifier’s acceptance probability is at most s for any (even unbounded)
prover’s deviation.
In Ref. [10], the completeness and the soundness are shown by introducing virtual pro-
tocols where the prover teleports quantum states to the verifier. In Appendix A, we give a
direct proof of the completeness and the soundness for the convenience of the readers.
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0. The input is an instance x ∈ A of a promise problem A = (Ayes, Ano) in BQP, and a
corresponding N -qubit local Hamiltonian
H ≡
∑
i<j
pi,j
2
(I⊗N + si,jXi ⊗Xj
2
+
I⊗N + si,jZi ⊗ Zj
2
)
with N = poly(|x|) such that if x ∈ Ayes then the ground energy is less than α, and if x ∈ Ano
then the ground energy is larger than β with β−α ≥ 1
poly(|x|) . Here, I ≡ |0〉〈0|+ |1〉〈1| is the
two-dimensional identity operator, Xi is the Pauli X operator acting on the ith qubit, Zi is
the Pauli Z operator acting on the ith qubit, pi,j > 0,
∑
i<j pi,j = 1, and si,j ∈ {+1,−1}.
1. The trusted center uniformly randomly chooses (h,m1, ...,mN ) ∈ {0, 1}N+1. The trusted
center sends
⊗N
j=1(H
h|mj〉) to the prover. The trusted center sends (h,m) to the verifier,
where m ≡ (m1, ...,mN ) ∈ {0, 1}N .
2. The prover does a POVM measurement {Πx,z}x,z on the received state. When the prover is
honest, the POVM corresponds to the teleportation of a low-energy state |E0〉 of the local
Hamiltonian H as if the states sent from the trusted center are halves of Bell pairs. The
prover sends the measurement result, (x, z), to the verifier, where x ≡ (x1, ..., xN ) ∈ {0, 1}N
and z ≡ (z1, ..., zN ) ∈ {0, 1}N .
3. The verifier samples (i, j) with probability pi,j, and accepts if and only if (−1)m′i(−1)m
′
j =
−si,j, where m′i ≡ mi ⊕ (hzi + (1− h)xi).
FIG. 1. The verification protocol of Ref. [10].
III. REPLACEMENT OF THE TRUSTED CENTER
Let us consider Protocol 2, which is the same as Protocol 1 except that the trusted
center is replaced with a ccRSP protocol. We show that such a modified protocol is not an
information-theoretically-sound verification protocol unless BQP ⊆ MABQP.
Before stating the result, let us define the class MABQP.
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Definition 1 A promise problem A = (Ayes, Ano) is in MABQP if and only if there exists a
classical probabilistic polynomial-time verifier such that
• If x ∈ Ayes, there exists a quantum polynomial-time prover that sends a classical
polynomial-length bit string to the verifier such that the verifier accepts with proba-
bility at least 2
3
.
• If x ∈ Ano, for any polynomial-length classical bit string from the prover (who can be
unbounded), the verifier’s acceptance probability is at most 1
3
.
It is easy to show that MABQP ⊆ MA. Now let us show our first result.
Theorem 2 Assume that Protocol 2 can verify any BQP problem. It means that for any
promise problem A = (Ayes, Ano) in BQP, Protocol 2 satisfies both of the following with
some c and s such that c− s ≥ 1
poly(|x|) :
• If x ∈ Ayes, the honest quantum polynomial-time prover’s behavior makes the verifier
accept with probability at least c.
• If x ∈ Ano, the verifier’s acceptance probability is at most s for any (even unbounded)
prover’s deviation.
Then, BQP ⊆ MABQP.
0. The same as the step 0 of Protocol 1.
1. The verifier and the prover run a ccRSP protocol. If the prover behaves honestly, the
verifier gets uniformly randomly chosen (h,m1, ...,mN ) ∈ {0, 1}N+1, and the prover gets
⊗N
j=1(H
h|mj〉).
2. The same as the step 2 of Protocol 1.
3. The same as the step 3 of Protocol 1.
FIG. 2. The modified protocol.
7
Before showing a proof, there is a remark. It is clear from the proof that what we
require for the ccRSP is only the correctness. Neither the blindness nor the verifiability
is required: The correctness means that Alice and Bob get correct outputs when they are
honest. In the present case, the correct outputs are
⊗N
j=1H
h|mj〉 for Bob and uniformly
random (h,m) ∈ {0, 1}N+1 for Alice. Usually when we use the ccRSP, we require the
blindness or the verifiability. The blindness means that h orm are “hidden” to even malicious
Bob, and the verifiability means that even if Bob is malicious Alice can guarantee that Bob
gets the correct state (up to Bob’s operation). Our theorem requires for the ccRSP only the
minimum requirement, namely, the correctness.
Proof. Let A = (Ayes, Ano) be any BQP promise problem. For any yes instance x ∈ Ayes,
the verifier’s acceptance probability phonestacc (x) of Protocol 2 is
phonestacc (x) = 1− Tr(H|E0〉〈E0|). (1)
(This is because when the prover is honest, Protocol 1 and Protocol 2 are the same.)
Let x ∈ Ano be any no instance. Let us consider the following malicious unbounded
prover’s attack:
1. When the prover and the verifier run the ccRSP protocol, the prover classically simu-
lates prover’s honest quantum behavior. (The verifier cannot distinguish whether the
prover is really doing the honest quantum procedure or simulating it classically. See
Appendix B.) The verifier gets uniformly random (h,m) ∈ {0, 1}N+1. The prover can
learn (h,m) because the prover has the classical description of
⊗N
j=1(H
h|mj〉). (See
Appendix B.)
2. If h = 0, the prover chooses (x, z) ∈ {0, 1}N × {0, 1}N , where x is sampled from
a certain distribution D, and z is uniformly randomly chosen. The prover sends
(x⊕m, z) to the verifier. Here, x⊕m ≡ (x1 ⊕m1, ..., xN ⊕mN). If h = 1, the prover
chooses (x, z) ∈ {0, 1}N × {0, 1}N , where z is sampled from the distribution D, and
x is uniformly randomly chosen. The prover sends (x, z ⊕ m) to the verifier. Here,
z ⊕m ≡ (z1 ⊕m1, ..., zN ⊕mN ).
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The verifier’s acceptance probability pmaliciousacc (x) under this prover’s attack is
pmaliciousacc (x) =
1
2
1
2N
∑
m
∑
x,z
1
2N
D(x)
∑
i<j
pi,j
1− (−1)mi+(xi+mi)+mj+(xj+mj)si,j
2
+
1
2
1
2N
∑
m
∑
x,z
1
2N
D(z)
∑
i<j
pi,j
1− (−1)mi+(zi+mi)+mj+(zj+mj)si,j
2
=
1
2
1
2N
∑
m
∑
x,z
1
2N
D(x)
∑
i<j
pi,j〈x|I
⊗N − si,jZi ⊗ Zj
2
|x〉
+
1
2
1
2N
∑
m
∑
x,z
1
2N
D(z)
∑
i<j
pi,j〈z|I
⊗N − si,jZi ⊗ Zj
2
|z〉
= Tr
[
(I⊗N −HZ)
∑
k∈{0,1}N
D(k)|k〉〈k|
]
, (2)
where |x〉 ≡⊗Nj=1 |xj〉, |z〉 ≡
⊗N
j=1 |zj〉, |k〉 ≡
⊗N
j=1 |kj〉, and
HZ ≡
∑
i<j
pi,j
I⊗N + si,jZi ⊗ Zj
2
.
On the other hand, let us consider Protocol 3. For any x ∈ Ayes, the verifier’s acceptance
probability qhonestacc (x) of Protocol 3 is
qhonestacc (x) =
1
2
∑
h∈{0,1}
∑
m∈{0,1}N
|〈m|(H⊗N)h|E0〉|2
∑
i<j
pi,j
1− (−1)mi+mjsi,j
2
=
1
2
∑
h∈{0,1}
∑
m∈{0,1}N
〈m|(H⊗N)h|E0〉〈E0|(H⊗N)h
∑
i<j
pi,j
I⊗N − si,jZi ⊗ Zj
2
|m〉
=
1
2
∑
h∈{0,1}
Tr
[
|E0〉〈E0|(H⊗N)h
∑
i<j
pi,j
I⊗N − si,jZi ⊗ Zj
2
(H⊗N)h
]
= Tr
[
|E0〉〈E0|(I⊗N −H)
]
= phonestacc (x),
where the last equality is from Eq. (1).
For any x ∈ Ano, the malicious prover samples m from any probability distribution D.
The verifier’s acceptance probability qmaliciousacc (x) is
qmaliciousacc (x) =
∑
m∈{0,1}N
D(m)
∑
i<j
pi,j
1− (−1)mi+mjsi,j
2
=
∑
m∈{0,1}N
D(m)〈m|
∑
i<j
pi,j
I⊗N − si,jZi ⊗ Zj
2
|m〉
= Tr
[
(I⊗N −HZ)
∑
m
D(m)|m〉〈m|
]
= pmaliciousacc (x),
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where |m〉 ≡ ⊗Nj=1 |mj〉 and the last equality is from Eq. (2). Therefore, if phonestacc and
pmaliciousacc have
1
poly(|x|) gap, q
honest
acc and q
malicious
acc also have
1
poly(|x|) gap, which means A is in
MABQP. Hence we have shown that BQP ⊆ MABQP.
1. If the prover is honest, it uniformly randomly chooses h ∈ {0, 1}, generates a low-energy
state |E0〉 of the local Hamiltonian H, and measures each qubit of |E0〉 in the computational
(Hadamard) basis if h = 0 (h = 1). The prover sends m ≡ (m1, ...,mN ) ∈ {0, 1}N to the
verifier, where mi is the measurement result on the ith qubit. If the prover is malicious, the
prover sends any m to the verifier.
2. The verifier samples (i, j) with probability pi,j, and accepts if and only if (−1)mi+mj = −si,j.
FIG. 3. The MABQP protocol.
IV. MORE GENERAL SETUP
In this section, we study a more general setup and show a similar no-go result. Let us
consider the verification protocol, Protocol 4. In the first step, the verifier (or the trusted
center) generates quantum states {ρi}i. We assume that this quantum process is a simple one
(for example, ρi is an N -tensor product of random BB84 states), because the verifier’s (or the
trusted center’s) quantum burden should be minimum. (If the verifier can do complicated
quantum computing, there is no point in delegating quantum computing to the prover: the
verifier can do the quantum computation by itself. Furthermore, if a trusted center that
can do complicated quantum computing is available, the verifier has only to use it instead
of interacting with the untrusted prover.)
We show that the first quantum message transmission (step 1) of Protocol 4 cannot
be replaced with a ccRSP protocol unless BQP ⊆ IPBQP[const], where IPBQP[const] is
the IP with a constant round and a honest quantum polynomial-time prover. Because
IPBQP[const] ⊆ IP[const] ⊆ AM, it means BQP ⊆ AM.
Let us consider Protocol 5 that is equivalent to Protocol 4 except that the first quantum
step of Protocol 4 is replaced with a ccRSP protocol. We consider a general setup where
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the ccRSP protocol is an approximate one: even if the prover is honest, they succeed with
probability psucc, and what the prover gets is a state ρ
′
i with probability p
′
i, where ρ
′
i is
close to ρi and {p′i}i is close to {pi}i. Furthermore, we assume that psucc is known, {p′i}i
is samplable in classical polynomial-time, and ρ′i can be generated in quantum polynomial-
time. These assumptions are reasonable, because the description of the ccRSP protocol is
known to the verifier, and {ρ′i}i and {p′i}i are close to {ρi}i and {pi}i, respectively.
Theorem 3 Assume that Protocol 5 can verify any BQP problem. It means that for any
promise problem A = (Ayes, Ano) in BQP, Protocol 5 satisfies both of the following with
some c and s such that c− s ≥ 1
poly(|x|) :
• If x ∈ Ayes, the honest quantum polynomial-time prover’s behavior makes the verifier
accept with probability at least c.
• If x ∈ Ano, the verifier’s acceptance probability is at most s for any (even unbounded)
prover’s deviation.
Then, BQP ⊆ IPBQP[const].
Remark. Again, the theorem requires only the correctness for the ccRSP. Neither the
blindness nor the verifiability is required.
1. The verifier generates a state ρi with probability pi, and sends it to the prover. Or, the
trusted center generates a state ρi with probability pi, sends it to the prover, and sends its
classical description [ρi] to the verifier.
2. The prover and the verifier exchange a constant round of classical messages. The honest
prover is quantum polynomial-time, but the malicious prover is unbounded. The verifier is
classical probabilistic polynomial-time.
3. The verifier finally makes the decision.
FIG. 4. The general protocol with quantum channel.
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1. The prover and the verifier run a ccRSP protocol. If the prover is honest, with probability
psucc, the prover gets a state ρ
′
i with probability p
′
i, and the verifier gets the classical de-
scription [ρ′i] of ρ
′
i. With probability 1− psucc, they fail, and the prover and the verifier get
an error message. If they fail, the verifier rejects.
2. The same as the step 2 of Protocol 4.
3. The same as the step 3 of Protocol 4.
FIG. 5. The general protocol with ccRSP.
Proof. Let A = (Ayes, Ano) be any BQP promise problem. For any yes instance x ∈ Ayes,
let phonestacc (x) be the verifier’s acceptance probability when the prover is honest in Protocol 5.
For any no instance x ∈ Ano, let us consider the following malicious unbounded prover’s
attack in Protocol 5:
1. When the prover and the verifier run the ccRSP protocol, the prover classically sim-
ulates prover’s honest quantum behavior. (See Appendix B.) If they succeed, the
verifier gets [ρ′i] with probability p
′
i. The prover can learn [ρ
′
i], because the prover has
the classical description of ρ′i. (See Appendix B.)
2. When the prover and the verifier exchange classical messages, the prover does any
malicious behavior.
Let us consider Protocol 6. For any yes instance x ∈ Ayes, let qhonestacc (x) be the verifier’s
acceptance probability with the honest prover in Protocol 6. Obviously,
phonestacc (x) = q
honest
acc (x). (3)
For any no instance x ∈ Ano, let qmaliciousacc (x) be the verifier’s acceptance probability in
Protocol 6 with the malicious prover. It is also easy to see that
pmaliciousacc (x) = q
malicious
acc (x). (4)
Therefore, if Protocol 5 can verify the promise problem A, Protocol 6 can also verify it,
which means that A is in IPBQP[const].
12
1. With probability psucc, the verifier chooses i with probability p
′
i and sends i to the prover.
If the prover is honest, it generates ρ′i. With probability 1− psucc, the verifier rejects.
2. The same as the step 2 of Protocol 5.
3. The same as the step 3 of Protocol 5.
FIG. 6. The IPBQP[const] protocol.
V. COMPUTATIONAL SOUNDNESS
We have seen that the replacement of the trusted center in the protocol of Ref. [10]
with the ccRSP does not realize the information-theoretically-sound classical verification
of quantum computing. What happens if we consider the computational soundness? In
this section, we show that if a ccRSP protocol satisfies a certain condition, the protocol
of Ref. [10] with the ccRSP is the classical verification of quantum computing (with the
computational soundness).
Theorem 4 Assume that a ccRSP protocol satisfies the following: For any quantum
polynomial-time malicious prover’s deviation, the verifier gets (h,m) ∈ {0, 1}N+1 with
probability
P (h,m) ≡ 1
2
Tr
[
(I⊗MB1 ⊗ |φh,m〉〈φh,m|B2)ρB1,B2(I⊗MB1 ⊗ |φh,m〉〈φh,m|B2)
]
,
and the prover gets a state
σh,m ≡ 1
2P (h,m)
TrB2
[
(I⊗MB1 ⊗ |φh,m〉〈φh,m|B2)ρB1,B2(I⊗MB1 ⊗ |φh,m〉〈φh,m|B2)
]
(up to a CPTP map on it), where B1 is a subsystem of M qubits, B2 is a subsystem of
N qubits, |φh,m〉 ≡
⊗N
j=1H
h|mj〉, ρB1,B2 is any (M +N)-qubit state (that could be chosen
by the prover), and TrB2 is the partial trace over the subsystem B2. Then, if we replace
the trusted center of the protocol of Ref. [10] with the ccRSP protocol, it is the classical
verification of quantum computing (with the computational soundness).
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Before showing the theorem, we have three remarks. First, note that when
ρB1,B2 =
( |00〉+ |11〉√
2
〈00|+ 〈11|√
2
)⊗N
,
P (h,m) = 1
2N+1
for any (h,m) and σh,m =
⊗N
j=1H
h|mj〉〈mj|Hh, which corresponds to the
honest prover case.
Second, the above condition is not satisfied against the unbounded malicious prover,
because, as is shown in Appendix B, the unbounded malicious prover can get the classical
description of σh,m and therefore what the prover gets is not σh,m but, for example, σh,m ⊗
|h,m〉〈h,m|.
Third, it was believed that the verifiability is neccesary for a ccRSP protocol when it is
used as a subroutine of the verification of quantum computing: even if malicious Bob deviates
during the ccRSP protocol, it should be guaranteed that the correct state is generated in
Bob’s place (up to his operation on it). Theorem 4 suggests that it is not necessarily the
case: as long as it is guaranteed that Bob does the correct measurement (i.e., the projection
|φh,m〉〈φh,m| ) on any state, the soundness of the verification protocol holds. It is easy to see
that the verifiability is a special case of our condition: In our condition, ρB1,B2 is any, but
the verifiability requires that ρB1,B2 is the N -tensor product of the Bell pair. Our condition
is therefore weaker than the verifiability.
Proof. Let A = (Ayes, Ano) be any promise problem in BQP. The completeness is obvious.
For any yes instance x ∈ Ayes, it is clear that the verifier’s acceptance probability with the
honest prover is pacc = 1− Tr(|E0〉〈E0|H) ≥ 1− α. (See Appendix A.)
Let us next consider the soundness. The verifier’s acceptance probability pacc with the
14
malicious prover is
pacc =
∑
h,m
P (h,m)
∑
x,z
Tr(Πx,zσh,m)
∑
i<j
pi,j
1− si,j(−1)m′i+m′j
2
=
∑
h,m
P (h,m)
∑
x,z
1
2P (h,m)
Tr
[(
Πx,z ⊗ |φh,m〉〈φh,m|
)
ρB1,B2
]∑
i<j
pi,j
1− si,j(−1)m′i+m′j
2
=
1
2
∑
h,m
∑
x,z
Tr
[
ρB1,B2
{
Πx,z ⊗ (H⊗N)h|m〉〈m|Xhz+(1−h)x
∑
i<j
pi,j
I⊗N − si,jZi ⊗ Zj
2
Xhz+(1−h)x(H⊗N)h
}]
=
1
2
∑
h
∑
x,z
Tr
[
ρB1,B2
{
Πx,z ⊗ (H⊗N)hXhz+(1−h)x
∑
i<j
pi,j
I⊗N − si,jZi ⊗ Zj
2
Xhz+(1−h)x(H⊗N)h
}]
=
∑
x,z
Tr
[
ρB1,B2
{
Πx,z ⊗ ZzXx(I⊗N −H)XxZz
}]
= 1− Tr(Hη)
≤ 1− β,
where Xx ≡⊗Nj=1Xxj , Zz ≡
⊗N
j=1Z
zj , Xhz+(1−h)x ≡⊗Nj=1Xhzj+(1−h)xj , |m〉 ≡
⊗N
j=1 |mj〉,
and
η ≡ TrB1
[∑
x,z
(
√
Πx,z ⊗XxZz)ρB1,B2(
√
Πx,z ⊗ ZzXx)
]
is an N -qubit state.
Appendix A: Proof of completeness and soundness
In this Appendix, we show the completeness and the soundness of Protocol 1. First, we
show the completeness. Let us define the Bell basis by |φα,β〉 ≡ (Zβ ⊗ Xα) |0〉⊗|0〉+|1〉⊗|1〉√2 ,
where α, β ∈ {0, 1}. We also define |m〉 ≡⊗Nj=1 |mj〉 and Xhz+(1−h)x ≡
⊗N
j=1X
hzj+(1−h)xj ,
where h ∈ {0, 1} and x, z ∈ {0, 1}N . The verifier’s acceptance probability with the honest
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prover is
pacc =
1
2
∑
h∈{0,1}
1
2N
∑
m∈{0,1}N
∑
x∈{0,1}N
∑
z∈{0,1}N
×
( N⊗
j=1
〈φxj ,zj |
)[
|E0〉〈E0| ⊗ (H⊗N)h|m〉〈m|(H⊗N)h
]( N⊗
j=1
|φxj,zj〉
)
×
∑
i<j
pi,j
1− si,j(−1)m′i+m′j
2
=
1
2
∑
h
1
2N
∑
m
∑
x,z
1
2N
〈m|(H⊗N)hZzXx|E0〉〈E0|XxZz(H⊗N)h|m〉
×
∑
i<j
pi,j
1− si,j(−1)m′i+m′j
2
=
1
2
∑
h
1
2N
∑
m
∑
x,z
1
2N
〈m|(H⊗N)hZzXx|E0〉〈E0|XxZz(H⊗N)h
×Xhz+(1−h)x
∑
i<j
pi,j
I⊗N − si,jZi ⊗ Zj
2
Xhz+(1−h)x|m〉
=
1
2
∑
h
1
2N
∑
x,z
1
2N
Tr
[
(H⊗N)hZzXx|E0〉〈E0|XxZz(H⊗N)h
×Xhz+(1−h)x
∑
i<j
pi,j
I⊗N − si,jZi ⊗ Zj
2
Xhz+(1−h)x
]
=
1
2N
∑
x,z
1
2N
Tr
[
|E0〉〈E0|1
2
∑
h
XxZz(H⊗N)h
×Xhz+(1−h)x
∑
i<j
pi,j
I⊗N − si,jZi ⊗ Zj
2
Xhz+(1−h)x(H⊗N)hZzXx
]
= Tr
[
|E0〉〈E0|(I⊗N −H)
]
≥ 1− α.
Here, in the second equality, we have used the following result: for any α, β, h,m ∈ {0, 1}
and any single-qubit state ρ,
〈φα,β|(ρ⊗Hh|m〉〈m|Hh)|φα,β〉 = 1
2
〈m|HhZβXαρXαZβHh|m〉.
Next we show the soundness. Let {Πx,z}x,z be the POVM that the malicious prover
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applies. The verifier’s acceptance probability is
pacc =
1
2
∑
h
1
2N
∑
m
∑
x,z
〈m|(H⊗N)hΠx,z(H⊗N)h|m〉
∑
i<j
pi,j
1− si,j(−1)m′i+m′j
2
=
1
2
∑
h
1
2N
∑
m
∑
x,z
〈m|(H⊗N)hΠx,z(H⊗N)hXhz+(1−h)x
×
∑
i<j
pi,j
I⊗N − si,jZi ⊗ Zj
2
Xhz+(1−h)x(H⊗N)h(H⊗N)h|m〉
=
1
2
∑
h
1
2N
∑
x,z
Tr
[
(H⊗N)hΠx,z(H⊗N)hXhz+(1−h)x
×
∑
i<j
pi,j
I⊗N − si,jZi ⊗ Zj
2
Xhz+(1−h)x(H⊗N)h(H⊗N)h
]
= Tr
[
(I⊗N −H)σ
]
≤ 1− β,
where σ ≡ 1
2N
∑
x,zX
xZzΠx,zZ
zXx, and the last inequality is from the fact that σ is a state
because Tr(σ) = 1 and σ ≥ 0.
Appendix B: Unbounded prover can learn (h,m)
In this Appendix, we show that the unbounded malicious prover can learn (h,m). With-
out loss of generality, a ccRSP protocol when the prover is honest is described as follows:
1. The verifier sends a classical message a1 to the prover.
2. The prover generates a state ρ1(a1).
3. The prover measures some qubits of ρ1(a1) in the computational basis to obtain a
result b1. The prover sends b1 to the verifier. Let ρ
′
1(a1, b1) be the post-measurement
state.
4. The verifier sends a classical message a2 to the prover.
5. The prover applies a unitary on ρ′1(a1, b1) to generate a state ρ2(a1, b1, a2). The prover
measures some qubits of ρ2(a1, b1, a2) in the computational basis to obtain a result
b2. The prover sends b2 to the verifier. Let ρ
′
2(a1, b1, a2, b2) be the post-measurement
state.
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6. The verifier sends a classical message a3 to the prover.
...
k. The verifier outputs (h,m) ∈ {0, 1}N+1. The prover has a state (⊗Nj=1Hh|mj〉)⊗ρjunk.
The unbounded prover can simulate the above process classically as follows:
1. The verifier sends a classical message a1 to the prover.
2. The prover classically computes the classical description of ρ1(a1).
3. The prover classically samples b1 with probability Tr[(|b1〉〈b1| ⊗ I)ρ1(a1)]. The prover
sends b1 to the verifier. Let ρ
′
1(a1, b1) be the post-measurement state. The prover
classically computes the classical description of ρ′1(a1, b1).
4. The verifier sends a classical message a2 to the prover.
5. The prover classically computes the classical description of ρ2(a1, b1, a2). The prover
classically samples b2 with probability Tr[(|b2〉〈b2| ⊗ I)ρ2(a1, b1, a2)]. The prover sends
b2 to the verifier. Let ρ
′
2(a1, b1, a2, b2) be the post-measurement state. The prover
classically computes the classical description of ρ′2(a1, b1, a2, b2).
6. The verifier sends a classical message a3 to the prover.
...
k. The verifier outputs (h,m) ∈ {0, 1}N+1. The prover has a classical description of
(
⊗N
j=1H
h|mj〉)⊗ ρjunk.
The verifier cannot distinguish whether the prover is doing the honest quantum procedure
or simulating it classically. Because the prover has the classical description of
⊗N
j=1H
h|mj〉,
the prover can learn (h,m).
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